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ABSTRACT
Corrupt expenditures by distributors, consultants, and other third-party
agents constitute one of the largest liability risks to global firms under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other applicable anti-corruption laws.
As globalization fuels corporate transactions and the vast scope of certain
anti-corruption laws, companies have begun inserting anti-corruption
provisions, varying widely in substance, into their contracts with business
partners seeking protection from potential corrupt conduct by these
business partners and attempting to shift risk of criminal penalties,
administrative fines and damage claims to the corrupt actors. This Article
considers from an international law perspective the substance, usage and
overarching goals of these anti-corruption provisions in contracts between
private parties, and in particular, corporate actors with an international
presence. It analyzes how the provisions function as corporate due
diligence tools, fusing contract and anti-corruption law in the context of
third-party intermediary risk. It concludes by offering recommended
drafting and enforcement models as a risk-reduction strategy to harmonize
with corporate compliance programs, and it suggests legislative reforms to
harness more effectively the benefits of provision usage from a public
policy perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
In the current age of economic globalization and open-border
commerce, the fight against corruption is developing into a worldwide
movement flowing through the public and private sectors. Companies
wishing to avoid prosecution for corruption-related offenses confront a
growing and complex nexus of anti-corruption laws affecting their local
and global operations, with non-compliance penalties posing significant
criminal and civil liability coupled with reputational harm and potential
exclusion from public contracts. Increased enforcement of anti-corruption
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law governing international commerce, including the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), Bribery Act 2010 (Bribery Act) and Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Cth) in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia,
respectively, has dramatically changed the global anti-corruption
compliance landscape.1 Companies that operate internationally, or contract
with third-party agents that do so, face increased scrutiny under these laws
and the accompanying need to implement compliance measures to avoid
prosecution.2
The rise of anti-corruption legislation and enforcement has in turn
shifted corporate culture towards a zero tolerance approach to bribery and
other forms of corruption. Corresponding changes to corporate governance
materialize in the formulation and implementation of internal anticorruption policies and practices, typically centralized through a
compliance program designed to ensure adherence with external anticorruption regulations as they develop. Such programs properly structured
can detect and address corrupt activity involving companies or their
employees, with policies and practices incorporating anti-corruption
principles that harmonize with existing legal and ethical obligations
alongside business operations. The programs’ features may include
employee trainings, detailed codes of conduct, and anonymous and
confidential reporting systems.
Heightened corruption risks surround third party agents, such as
business development consultants, sales representatives, subcontractors,
distributors, lawyers, accountants and other intermediaries, as they pose
immense liability concerns for companies conducting international business
indirectly through these third parties.3 The FCPA and Bribery Act, for
example, impose liability upon organizations for the actions of their
employees, distributors and other agents when acting on their principals’
behalf.4 Moreover, a majority of recently reported FCPA cases involve
bribery schemes that rely upon third-party intermediaries, highlighting the
prevalence of this corrupt practice.5

1. Ben Allen, Contracting Out of Corruption, LINKEDIN (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.li
nkedin.com/pulse/contracting-out-corruption-can-done-ben-allen?trk=portfolio_articlecard_title [https://perma.cc/DC57-VCHC].
2. Id.
3. See F. Joseph Warin et al., The British are Coming!: Britain Changes its Law on
Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1,
38 (2010) (explaining that both the FCPA and the Bribery Act require companies to develop
internal control procedures that effectively prevent corruption).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (2018); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 7(1), 8(1) (U.K.). See
also Warin et al., supra note 3, at 40–41 (comparing FCPA and Bribery Act provisions).
5. Arthur & Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Third Party
Intermediaries, FCPA CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:23 PM), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/cha
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Even with the most robust anti-corruption compliance program in
place, a company cannot necessarily dictate how its third-party agents carry
out their internal operations, and no company can guarantee that its agents
will bring zero corruption risk. This exposure leaves companies vulnerable
to corrupt acts, with the third party agents constituting “a chink in
[organizations’] armour against bribery and corruption prosecution.”6
Companies as a result “are alive to the risk of being tainted by the corrupt
action of a counterparty,”7 rendering third-party risk management a
necessity for companies with any direct or indirect international operations.
To address third-party risk more effectively, the tools of contract law
offer the private sector a form of protection from potential corrupt and
unethical conduct arising from their consultants or other agents.
Companies can include anti-corruption compliance provisions within their
contracts with third-party intermediaries, and the provisions can
fundamentally proscribe by contract any corrupt activity related to the
contract while it remains in force. If properly drafted and enforced, the
provisions may shield a company from corrupt acts perpetrated by its thirdparty intermediaries and in connection with any corresponding criminal,
civil or administrative proceedings.8 Functioning as a warranty, the
provisions may also serve as evidence that a company has not engaged in
corrupt activity related to the contract prior to execution and during its
lifetime. As the contract sets the bar for the principal-agent relationship, it
offers a critical yet underutilized mechanism to help shield companies from
criminal liability arising from this third-party risk.
While a party cannot contract out of criminal liability, anti-corruption
contractual provisions may effectively shift liability risk such that it
remains with the agent engaged in wrongdoing, provided such provisions
are structured appropriately and integrated within a larger compliance
program. Parties may draft anti-corruption contractual provisions to create
mutual trust and cooperation, provide assurance of integrity, and protect the
business relationship from the taint of corruption during the pre-contractual
period through the lifespan of the contract. No set formula or governmentendorsed standards exist internationally in relation to recommended content
of anti-corruption provisions, leaving companies with a plethora of
rt-intermediary.html [https://perma.cc/QB7K-N9T7] [hereinafter FCPA CLEARINGHOUSE].
6. Allen, supra note 1.
7. Katherine Meloni & Gabrielle Ereira, Anti-Corruption Provisions in Loan
Documentation (2016), https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2536213/anti-corruptionprovisions-in-loan-documentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLV7-C79A].
8. Juan Francisco González Guarderas, What Should You Know when Entering into a
Contract with an Anti-Corruption Clause? (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.pbplaw.com/en/aque-me-obligo-cuando-firmo-contrato-clausula-anticorrupcion/
[https://perma.cc/NBK8HF4T].
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protection options from which to choose. Provisions could address suitable
record-keeping measures, adequate internal controls and procedures,
ongoing monitoring, and objective audit, suspension, termination, and
indemnification rights in connection with the agreement, among other
possibilities.
This Article scrutinizes the synthesis between contract and anticorruption law in the context of third-party intermediary risk, explores the
conceptual landscape and spectrum of anti-corruption contractual
provisions available to business arrangements, and offers suggested models
for drafting and enforcement as a risk-reduction strategy to minimize
exposure in light of existing international anti-corruption legislation. Part I
of the Article provides overviews of the nature of corruption in the
corporate sector, international anti-corruption enforcement through
domestic legislation and international instruments, and the role of the
corporate compliance program to address anti-corruption obligations. Part
II examines the origins and legal background of anti-corruption contractual
provisions as a corporate due diligence tool in commercial agreements,
critiques existing model clauses proffered by international organizations,
and surveys the range of possible anti-corruption rights and obligations
available to contracting parties. Part III concludes with recommendations
for harmonizing balanced and commercially workable contractual
provisions with anti-corruption compliance program operations through
structured risk management, analyzes the potential legal shortcomings with
such provisions, and suggests ways in which subsequent legislative efforts
can capitalize upon the beneficial effects of provision usage from a public
policy perspective.
I. BUSINESS CORRUPTION AND CORRESPONDING LEGAL REGULATION
A. Corruption Pervades the Private Sector
Corruption, the misuse of entrusted authority for private gain,
permeates the private sector globally.9 Corrupt acts, such as bribery, fraud,
abuse of power, embezzlement, extortion, and money laundering, entice
perpetrators to gain a business advantage or garner illicit profit sub rosa,
and research findings indicate such activity remains widespread across
industries.10 The International Monetary Fund estimates that businesses
9. What Is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/what-iscorruption [https://perma.cc/VNV5-JCNW]; Engaging the Private Sector in the Fight
Against Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity
/engagingtheprivatesectorinthefightagainstcorruption [https://perma.cc/S4Y4-Z93R].
10. See Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money
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and individuals annually pay $1.5 trillion in bribes, amounting to roughly
2% of global GDP.11 World Bank surveys from more than 135,000 firms
across 139 countries show roughly 20 percent of such firms reported
experiencing at least one bribery request.12
While no industry is immune, the energy, mining, construction,
military defense, oil, telecommunications, medical and pharmaceutical,
transportation and property development sectors are particularly prone to
corruption.13 Across industries, ever-present opportunities to engage in
corruption could surface at seemingly any point in the lifecycle of a
transaction. Corruption may insert itself, for instance, in an infrastructure
or construction project’s identification, financing, planning, design,
tendering, execution, operation and/or maintenance phases.14
Deemed “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social
development around the world,” corruption ushers in economic, social,
political and environmental harms to societies it touches.15 While
companies may perceive that by engaging in corrupt acts, they may reap
competitive advantages, empirical studies illustrate the damage corruption
brings to the commercial realm. For example, empirical findings
demonstrate that corruption creates operational inefficiencies in the
business sector, requiring more employees to complete the same amount of
work, ultimately making companies less productive.16 Firms operating in
corrupt regions show inter alia more inefficient management practices,

Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and
Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS., 263, 303 (2003) (summarizing types
of foreign corrupt activities); Corruption by Topic, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.trans
parency.org/topic [https://perma.cc/P9BZ-GXZ8] (identifying industries prone to
corruption).
11. INT’L MONETARY FUND, CORRUPTION: COSTS AND MITIGATING STRATEGIES 5
(2016), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/
sdn/2016/sdn1605.ashx [https://perma.cc/C84R-BYM6].
12. World Bank Group, Enterprise Surveys: Corruption (Jan. 7, 2019), http://www.ente
rprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/corruption [https://perma.cc/2XJD-YTM8].
13. OECD, Foreign Bribery Fact Sheet 1 (Oct. 2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/Foreign_Bribery_Factsheet_ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9HQ-BDXQ].
14. GIACC, How Corruption Occurs (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.giaccentre.org/how_c
orruption_occurs.php [https://perma.cc/6V5M-GPAA].
15. UNODC, ‘It’s a Crime’: Corruption (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/frontpage/2015/February/its-a-crime_-corruption.html [https://perma.cc/UF5M-SH3C].
See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNIE J. PALIFKA, CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 27–36 (2d ed. 2016) (summarizing
empirical findings addressing the effects of corruption); Philip M. Nichols, The Business
Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 325, 338–40 (2012) (analyzing
harmful economic effects of corruption in the business sector).
16. Ernesto Dal Bóa & Martín A. Rossi, Corruption and Inefficiency: Theory and
Evidence from Electric Utilities, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 939, 958–60 (2007).
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smaller product markets, lower export prospects, and lower levels of
innovation and R&D investment.17 Indeed, a large academic consensus
identifies the corrosive impact of corruption on economic growth.18
B. International Anti-Corruption Enforcement Through Domestic
Legislation and International Instruments
Most countries outlaw bribery and other forms of corruption through
domestic legislation, and many use criminal sanctions and civil penalties
with supplemental regulatory action to enforce and deter.19 Typically an
anti-corruption law extends its reach to transactions occurring within the
respective jurisdiction, but a number of countries have enacted expansive
criminal legislation with extraterritorial scope that forbids bribes to foreign
officials in international transactions.20 The FCPA and Bribery Act are
perhaps the most prominent examples of such an approach.
The United States enacted the FCPA in 1977 to outlaw payments to
foreign government officials that are made to assist in securing or retaining
business.21 The first criminal statute to outlaw international corruption, it
prohibits individuals and companies from corruptly offering, promising, or
providing anything of value to foreign officials in order to secure or retain
an improper advantage22 and requires companies whose securities are listed
in the United States to maintain books and records that accurately and

17. Daphne Athanasouli & Antoine Goujard, Corruption and Management Practices:
Firm Level Evidence, 43 J. COMP. ECON. 1014, 1032 (2015).
18. See, e.g., Transparency Int’l, The Impact of Corruption on Growth and Inequality
(Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Impact_of _corru
ption_on_growth_and_inequality_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5E6-CALT] (examining how
corruption “adversely affect[s] long-term economic growth through its impact on
investment, taxation, public expenditures and human development”); Giorleny D.
Altamirano, The Impact of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 38 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 487, 492–97 (2007) (discussing research findings regarding the negative
impact of corruption on the economy).
19. See Jeffrey R. Boles, Criminalizing the Problem of Unexplained Wealth: Illicit
Enrichment Offenses and Human Rights Violations, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 835,
842 (2015) (providing an overview of international anti-corruption efforts).
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2018); Antonio Argandoña, The 1996 ICC Report on
Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, 6 BUS. ETHICS 134, 136
(1997) (discussing countries enacting anti-corruption legislation).
21. See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 422 (2012)
(providing a brief history of the FCPA).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1–78dd-3, 78ff (2018). Accord Rahul Kohli, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1301 (2018) (“No other country enacted
a similar piece of anti-bribery legislation until 1997 when the international community
began to take substantial steps to criminalize corruption in transnational commercial
dealings.”).
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fairly reflect the companies’ transactions and maintain an adequate system
Due to its broad jurisdictional
of internal accounting controls.23
interpretation, the law extends its reach extraterritorially to business
transactions conducted entirely outside of the U.S.24 Moreover, general
corporate liability principles apply to the FCPA, rendering a company
liable for FCPA violations through the actions of its officers, directors,
employees, or agents acting within the scope of their employment and
intended to benefit the company.25
The United Kingdom enacted the Bribery Act in 201026 to modernize
and strengthen its anti-bribery laws, creating what “has been widely
received as one of the most far-reaching anti-bribery laws of any country or
international organization.”27 The Bribery Act criminalizes active bribery
(offering, promising or giving a bribe), passive bribery (requesting,
accepting or agreeing to receive a bribe), commercial bribery (private-toprivate bribery), and bribery of a foreign official to obtain or retain
business or advantage in conducting business.28 It also creates a new type
of corporate liability in the failure of a commercial organization to prevent
bribery by persons associated with it.29 This latter provision, the first of its
kind globally, effectively imposes strict liability for organizations that fail
to prevent bribery by their employees or agents,30 and its broad
extraterritorial reach covers any entity that conducts “part of a business” in
the U.K.31 The Act tempers its “failure to prevent” offense with a full
defense available to any organization that has implemented adequate

23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B).
24. See Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 602–04 (2002) (“In its current form, the FCPA purports to reach
foreigners who have virtually any sort of contact with the United States in furtherance of a
violation of the act and U.S. nationals who do anything in furtherance of such a violation
anywhere in the world.”).
25. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 27 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/f
cpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT7N-GPYW] [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE
GUIDE] (discussing corporate liability principles for bribery violations).
26. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (Eng.).
27. Kohli, supra note 22, at 1307.
28. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 1, 2, 6 (Eng.).
29. Id. at § 7.
30. Warin et al., supra note 3, at 38.
31. Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & the New
UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of
Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 845, 866 (“[A]ny international corporation that does
any kind of business in the [U.K.] can be held criminally liable for failure to prevent bribery
even when the corporation is not based in the [U.K.], the offensive bribe did not take place
in the [U.K.], or the recipient of the bribe is not from the [U.K.].”).
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procedures to prevent bribery by persons associated with it.32
A growing, cross-border anti-corruption regime recently surfaced to
coordinate national enforcement system efforts and encourage the
development of domestic criminal legislation.33 The anti-bribery measures
of international organizations largely facilitated the growth of this
infrastructure, as the organizations’ multilateral agreements require
signatory nations to maintain criminal laws that penalize corruption and to
The 1997 OECD
implement other anti-corruption mechanisms.34
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions,35 the 1999 Council of Europe Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption,36 and the 2003 United Nations Convention
against Corruption37 for instance require signatory countries to criminalize
bribery involving foreign public officials, and the agreements significantly
These
facilitated the development of transnational bribery laws.38
collective efforts propelled the global anti-corruption movement, with most
nations now retaining substantive laws that prohibit various corrupt
activities.39
32. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (Eng.). Accord MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY
ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 8 (2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181762/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PCK-7UWG] [hereinafter BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE] (“The defence is also
included in order to encourage commercial organisations to put procedures in place to
prevent bribery by persons associated with them.”). The FCPA does not contain a similar
defense. Jon Jordan, The Adequate Procedures Defense Under the UK Bribery Act: A
British Idea for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 25, 33 (2011).
33. See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 698–711
(2007) (detailing international anti-corruption initiatives).
34. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
793, 813–14 (2001) (explaining that Article IX of the IACAC requires signatory nations to
adopt laws that criminalize an inexplicable increase in a government official’s assets).
35. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and Related Documents 7 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/E58P-RZ89].
36. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, COUNCIL EUR. (Jan. 27, 1999), http://con
ventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htm [https://perma.cc/AF7T-2FSH].
37. G.A. Res. 58/4, annex, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4/Annex, Convention Against
Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003).
38. See Jeffrey R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: International Corruption
Pathways Meet Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 680 (2014); see
also TRACE, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2011 (2011), https://www.strtrade.com/m
edia/publication/6092_2011-August-19-fcpa_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UXU-2ANN]
(“The goal of such laws and conventions is to create a fair and transparent international
business market rather than one skewed by under-the-table deals that enrich government
officials at the expense of their fellow citizens.”).
39. See Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law Enforcement to
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C. Attacking Corruption in the Private Sector Through the Corporate
Compliance Function
A self-policing private sector is necessary to fight corruption
effectively, and governments can incentivize organizations to self-police
and cooperate through reward-and-penalty approaches.40 To manage the
massive issue of identifying and investigating corporate wrongdoing,
particularly involving crimes like international bribery that may be virtually
impossible to detect without corporate admission, governments can employ
the threat of corporate criminal liability with the prospect of leniency as a
dual mechanism to induce companies to monitor their own agents, identify
wrongdoing, and make disclosures to the relevant government agency.41 In
doing so, governments shift the investigatory burden to companies, easing
the practical difficulties governments face with the expensive and timeconsuming nature of investigatory work, the complexity of corporate
accounting and bookkeeping, and limited budgets.42
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines demonstrate this carrot-and-stick
approach by offering to reward organizations that voluntarily disclose
violations, cooperate with law enforcement, and “promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law” with a reduction in offense level.43 The U.K.

Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for
Indonesia and Other Countries, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 183, 194 (2008) (“[M]ost developing
countries now have a range of substantive provisions prohibiting bribery and other acts of
public corruption.”).
40. Julie R. O’Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed Revisions to the Organizational
Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 494 (2004) (examining how a corporation’s liability
exposure can significantly be reduced resulting from awarded credits for compliance
programs, self-reporting, cooperation during the investigative stage, and accepting
responsibility).
41. Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The Market for Global Anticorruption
Enforcement, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 211 (2017).
42. Robert S. Bennett et al., From Regulation to Prosecution to Cooperation: Trends in
Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the White Collar
Criminal Defense Attorney, 68 BUS. LAW. 411, 417 (2013). Accord, William R. McLucas et
al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 639 (2006) (examining how “private lawyers are effectively ‘deputized’
in many internal investigations, and the government obtains the facts of their inquiry
through waiver of attorney-client privilege”).
43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2004);
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§ 9-28.300 (U.S. DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizatio
ns#9-28.300 [https://perma.cc/JU6S-62VN] (discussing factors to be considered when
deciding whether to bring charges against a corporate target, including, inter alia, “the
corporation’s willingness to cooperate, including as to potential wrongdoing by its agents”).
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follows a similar approach,44 and a number of international instruments also
advocate for companies to adopt and implement compliance programs and
codes of conduct.45 With this growing dynamic, multinational companies
have legal and financial incentives to exercise diligence in detecting and
preventing wrongdoing and to sustain an ethical corporate culture with an
effective compliance program.46
Compliance programs constitute a fundamental component of a
company’s enterprise risk management and internal controls framework
that assesses the operative risks and realities inherent in the company’s
operations.47 Properly structured compliance programs can effectively
detect and address instances of corruption involving companies or their
agents, with such anti-corruption practices serving to protect corporate
reputations and stakeholder interests.48 While no compliance program
could detect every instance of criminal activity involving a company,
critical factors inherent in any program, from the lens of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), center upon “whether the program is adequately designed
for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by
employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the program or
44. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 8 (“The commercial organisation’s
willingness to co-operate with an investigation under the Bribery Act and to make a full
disclosure will also be taken into account in any decision as to whether it is appropriate to
commence criminal proceedings.”); Kevin J. Smith, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Set
Aside the Moral and Ethical Debates, How Does One Operate Within This Law?, 45
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1119, 1134–35 (2017) (comparing U.S. and U.K. approaches).
45. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions §§ III, X (Nov. 26, 2009),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47C6-4LWY]
(recommending that its signatory countries adopt business sector requirements regarding the
implementation of accounting, external audit, internal control, ethics, and compliance
requirements and practices in order to detect and prevent bribery of foreign public officials).
46. Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 775 (2014). But see United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2006)
(noting that a corporation cannot “avoid liability by adopting abstract rules” that prohibit its
agents from engaging in illegal conduct, as “[e]ven a specific directive to an agent or
employee or honest efforts to police such rules do not automatically free the company for
the wrongful acts of agents”); JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.800 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizatio
ns#9-28.800 [https://perma.cc/XC2J-Y3PM] (“[T]he existence of a compliance program is
not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct
undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”).
47. Stucke, supra note 46, at 776–79.
48. Neha Das, Eliminate Corruption to Build Sustainable, Inclusive and Transparent
Societies, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-g
c/our-work/governance/anti-corruption [https://perma.cc/P4V3-NUBH] (discussing how
mobilizing business can provide a united voice against corruption, as “[c]ollective action is
essential for bringing an end to a systemic issue that is too complex for any company to
tackle alone”).
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is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to
achieve business objectives.”49
There is no set formula for structuring a compliance program, but
prosecutors, when assessing such programs, typically examine whether a
program is well designed, effective in application, and applied earnestly
and in good faith, as they differentiate between mere “paper programs” and
suitably designed and implemented programs that are reviewed and revised
as appropriate.50 Companies with effective programs maintain sufficient
compliance staff to document, analyze, utilize and audit results from the
programs and provide adequate training to employees and other agents
regarding the program’s operations and company’s commitment to the
program.51 Such programs tailor their functions to align with the
fundamentals of company product lines or services and attendant market
supply chain and work force, the degree of regulation and government
interaction, and the extent to which the company operates in countries with
a high risk of corruption.52
Through its operations, an effective compliance program bridges
legal, risk management and ethics policy and practice by thwarting
corruption and other illicit activity in a risk-based approach tailored to the
company’s industry, size and location and focused upon identified
corruption risks and schemes.53 Such a compliance program can deter
corruption from multiple angles by overseeing proper accounting and
auditing practices that ensure all firm expenditures have been authorized
and accounted for, taking appropriate disciplinary action against any
employee or agent who has violated company anti-corruption policies, and
providing an anonymous reporting system where any employee or agent
can report apparent anti-corruption policy violations without fear of

49. JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.800.B (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2019), https://www.justice.g
ov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.800 [https://p
erma.cc/4AA6-B2SR].
50. Id.
51. Id.; BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 20–31 (detailing its six guiding
principles for effective compliance programs).
52. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 25, at 40.
53. Professors David Hess and Thomas Dunfee have argued that, to impact corrupt
practices, a company’s anti-corruption principles “must (1) emphasize transparency; (2)
provide guidance concerning specific practices associated with paying bribes; (3) be
relevant to organizational environments; (4) identify itself with and be supported by an
independent entity such as a non-governmental organization or an academic center, and,
perhaps most importantly; (5) be capable of monitoring and assessment by external,
independent entities, such as social and financial auditors.” David Hess & Thomas W.
Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating
Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 618 (2000).
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retribution.54
II. CONTRACT LAW AS ANTI-CORRUPTION MECHANISM TO FIGHT
THIRD-PARTY RISK
A. The Advent of Anti-Corruption Contractual Provisions as
Corporate Due Diligence Tools
Business
development
consultants,
sales
representatives,
subcontractors, distributors, lawyers, accountants and other intermediaries
pose corruption risks that constitute massive liability concerns for
companies conducting overseas business indirectly through such third
parties.55 The FCPA and Bribery Act impose liability upon organizations
for the actions of their employees, distributors and other third-party agents
when acting on their principals’ behalf.56 Recent FCPA enforcement
actions show how third-party intermediaries frequently engage in
international business transactions and attempt to conceal bribery payments
to foreign officials.57 Roughly ninety percent of all recently reported FCPA
cases involve bribery schemes that rely upon third-party intermediaries,
rendering third-party risk management a critical concern for companies
with overseas operations.58
In apparent recognition of the fulsome liability danger, the primary
internationally recognized business instruments on anti-bribery, including
those from the World Bank, OECD, International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), and Transparency International, offer guidance on internal controls
and compliance practices pertaining to third-party risk in order to assist
companies in addressing this precarious area.59 The instruments advocate
for the adoption of corporate policies that support third-party compliance
with anti-corruption rules.60 Recurring advice in such instruments
surrounds the need to conduct “properly documented risk-based due

54. Id. at 621.
55. Warin et al., supra note 3, at 38.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (1998); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 7(1), 8(1) (Eng.); see
also Warin et al., supra note 3, at 40–41 (comparing the FCPA and Bribery Act provisions).
57. KPMG, THIRD-PARTY RISK MANAGEMENT 2–3 (2014), https://advisory.kpmg.us/co
ntent/dam/advisory/en/pdfs/third-party-risk-management-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/87MVB86R].
58. FCPA CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 5.
59. OECD ET AL., ANTI-CORRUPTION ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK FOR
BUSINESS 38–46 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-CorruptionEthicsComplianc
eHandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D6B-QVHR] (detailing provisions of business guidance
instruments on anti-bribery).
60. Id.
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diligence pertaining to the hiring, as well as the appropriate and regular
oversight of business partners,”61 to notify business partners of a
company’s commitment to abiding by the terms of applicable anti-bribery
laws and of the company’s compliance program addressing anti-bribery
practices, and to seek a reciprocal commitment from business partners.62
To mitigate the risk that third-party payments will constitute bribery
violations, many companies now implement extensive compliance policies
and practices that govern third-party intermediary conduct as part of their
due diligence processes.63 One due diligence process in particular, the
inclusion of anti-corruption compliance provisions in agreements with
third-party intermediaries, has been recognized as one of the most effective
ways to mitigate liability risks posed by third parties.64 If structured and
enforced properly, the provisions may effectively protect a company from
corrupt acts perpetrated by its third-party intermediaries and in connection
with any resulting criminal, administrative or civil proceedings.65
These provisions essentially prohibit by contract third-party
intermediaries and their agents from engaging in any corrupt activity
related to the contract while it remains in force. Moreover, the provisions
may provide evidence that a company has not paid bribes or otherwise
engaged in corrupt activity related to the contract prior to the contract’s

61. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance
§ A.6.i (Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YW66-U56S] [hereinafter Good Practice Guidance]. See also World Bank Grp., World
Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 5.1 (Sept. 2010), http://siteresources.worldb
ank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EHX277T] [hereinafter Integrity Compliance Guidelines] (“Conduct properly documented, riskbased due diligence (including to identify any beneficial owners or other beneficiaries not
on record) before entering into a relationship with a business partner, and on an ongoing
basis”).
62. Good Practice Guidance, supra note 61, at § A.6.ii-iii.
63. Warin et al., supra note 3, at 40 (discussing diligence regarding FCPA risks of
third-party business partners); Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend
to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2008).
64. See Kohli, supra note 22, at 1322 (“Addressing FCPA compliance in the formative
contract is widely recognized as the best way to mitigate risks posed by ‘red flag’
transactions.”); Daniel J. Grimm, Traversing the Minefield: Joint Ventures and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 91, 146 (2014) (“FCPA risks can be further
reduced by including various contractual provisions within joint-venture agreements and
contracts with third parties.”); Meloni & Ereira, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing usage of anticorruption provisions in English law loan documentation); Neil McInnes, Addressing the
Bribery Act in Your Contracts: A Tiered Approach, CONSTRUCTION BLOG (June 13, 2012),
http://constructionblog.practicallaw.com/addressing-the-bribery-act-in-your-contracts-a-tier
ed-approach/ [https://perma.cc/CZT8-NA8T] (analyzing effective use of anti-corruption
clauses in supply chain and subcontractor contracts).
65. Guarderas, supra note 8.
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execution and during its lifetime.66
Government agencies through earlier enforcement activity served as
initial catalysts to raise private sector awareness on the use of anticorruption contractual provisions with third-party agents. They have
required defendants in enforcement actions to insert anti-corruption
provisions in their third-party contracts as part of their larger due diligence
compliance efforts. For instance, defendant Metcalf & Eddy agreed as part
of its consent agreement with the DOJ in 1999 to implement an anticorruption compliance program where contracts with its agents and other
representatives include a clause stating that the parties will not offer bribes
and that the counterparty agent will not employ a sub-agent without the
prior written consent of Metcalf & Eddy.67 The DOJ also endorsed the use
of anti-corruption compliance provisions in third-party contracts through
issued opinions68 and deferred prosecution agreements,69 and the SEC has
noted in prior complaints whether defendants contractually bound their
third-party consultants to comply with the FCPA.70
The U.K. Ministry of Justice likewise advocates for firms to follow
this approach.71 It strongly advocates for companies to employ anti66. Guarderas, supra note 8.
67. Consent & Undertaking of Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. at § 4.i, United States v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., No. 99-cv-12566 (D. Mass. 1999), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/40
00/002858.pdf [https://perma.cc/763N-938G]. This case constitutes the first instance where
the DOJ provided a detailed list of features that a defendant corporation should include in a
remedial compliance and ethics program; Philip Urofsky et al., How Should We Measure the
Effectiveness of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Don’t Break What Isn’t Broken—The
Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1153–54 (2012).
68. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 2008–02 (June 13,
2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/0802.pd
f [https://perma.cc/WE6N-3EP5] [hereinafter DOJ Release 2008–02] (“All agents and other
third parties . . . will as soon as commercially reasonable be required to sign new contracts
. . . with Halliburton that incorporate appropriate FCPA and anti-corruption representations
and warranties, anti-corruption provisions, and audit rights, as provided for under
Halliburton’s Code of Business Conduct and related policies and procedures.”).
69. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-7, United States v. Panalpina World
Transp. (Holding) Ltd., No. 4:10-cr-00769 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.justice.g
ov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/11-04-10panalpina-world-dpa.pdf [h
ttps://perma.cc/J7PL-FG76] (“Panalpina will include standard provisions in agreements,
contracts, and renewals thereof with all agents and business partners that are reasonably
calculated to prevent violations of the anticorruption laws . . . .”).
70. See Complaint at ¶ 17, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 14-CV9956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2014/comp-pr20
14-285.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z47-3BYR] (“Avon Products China did not contractually
bind Consulting Company 1 to comply with the FCPA.”).
71. See BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 39 (endorsing the use of suitable
contractual terms on bribery prevention measures in agreements between parties). Notably,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission in its Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations does not
explicitly address the use of anti-corruption contractual provisions, but comments that large
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corruption provisions with counterparties in their supply chain:
The principal way in which commercial organisations may
decide to approach bribery risks which arise as a result of a
supply chain is by employing the types of anti-bribery procedures
referred to elsewhere in this guidance (e.g. risk-based due
diligence and the use of anti-bribery terms and conditions) in the
relationship with their contractual counterparty, and by
requesting that counterparty to adopt a similar approach with the
next party in the chain.72
Scholars and practitioners have also endorsed the application of anticorruption contractual provisions to corporate business partners and
stressed their utility in helping to control difficulties companies face in
complying with anti-corruption laws.73 David Hess & Thomas Dunfee
have highlighted how agents, particularly those that facilitate sales and
marketing, are often conduits by which firms make payments, and such
firms may not be aware of their sales and marketing agents making
improper payments to government officials using commissions and fees.74
Their anti-corruption C2 Principles require firms to obtain from all of their
suppliers affirmation that the suppliers have not and will not make
improper payments in any contract to which the firm is a party.75
Others note how anti-corruption contractual provisions containing
appropriate remedies for breach76 may prevent a company from having to
choose between continuing an agreement that raises corruption risks or
subsequently breaching the agreement due to previously unknown
corruption liability.77 The provisions may allow the company to exit the

organizations should encourage smaller organizations that seek to contract with them to
implement effective compliance and ethics programs. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) cmt. 2(C)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004).
72. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 16.
73. See Ike Adams & Robert Keeling, Vicarious Liability Risks Facing the Financial
Industry under the FCPA, 9 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 1, 32 (2017) (advocating for
“appropriate contractual representations with third-party intermediaries relating to
compliance with the FCPA and relevant foreign anti-corruption laws”); Christopher F. Corr
& Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t? The OECD Convention and the
Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1249, 1343 (1999)
(urging multinational companies to adopt anti-corruption measures to mitigate the risk that
emanates from dealings with other businesses).
74. Hess & Dunfee, supra note 53, at 622.
75. Hess & Dunfee, supra note 53, at 621. Designed for voluntary adoption by firms,
the C2 Principles “require firms to implement procedures to prevent the payment of bribes
and to publicly disclose their progress and efforts towards these ends.” Hess & Dunfee,
supra note 53, at 594.
76. See infra Part II.C.iii (examining termination rights).
77. Kohli, supra note 22, at 1322.
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contractual relationship cleanly.78
Warin and colleagues emphasize the benefits of combining anticorruption contractual provisions with appropriate due diligence on a third
party, as such a combination may significantly decrease the likelihood that
prosecutors would allege that a company “consciously disregarded or
remained deliberately ignorant of the possibility of a corrupt payment, even
if the third party does make such a payment.”79 Beyond reducing the risk
of prosecution, companies that include properly enforced anti-corruption
contractual provisions in their third-party contracts may pursue a private
cause of action against their agents for breach of contract if the agents
materially violate the provisions.80
B. Formalizing Anti-Corruption Contractual Provisions with Model
Clauses
While the benefits of anti-corruption contractual provisions have been
recognized for roughly two decades, there has been no apparent consensus
or uniform approach regarding when to require such provisions in a
contract or what types of anti-corruption commitments within which to
For instance, many international anti-bribery business
include.81
instruments stress the importance of including anti-corruption
commitments in contracts with business partners but differ in the specific
types of commitments and breach remedies they recommend.82
To illustrate, the OECD Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls,
Ethics and Compliance advises companies to consider informing their
business partners of their anti-corruption commitments and ethics and
compliance program and to seek “a reciprocal commitment from business
partners.”83 The World Economic Forum’s PACI Principles for Countering
Bribery (the PACI Principles) advises that an enterprise’s “agent, adviser or
other intermediary should contractually agree in writing to comply with the
enterprise’s [compliance program]” and that “[p]rovision should be
included in all contracts with agents, advisers and other intermediaries
relating to access to records, cooperation in investigations and similar
78. Grimm, supra note 64, at 146–47.
79. Warin et al., supra note 3, at 41.
80. Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm:
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 205
n.290 (2000).
81. See McInnes, supra note 64 (noting that the Ministry of Justice guidance does not
provide detail on anti-bribery terms and conditions).
82. See supra Part II.A (discussing recommendations of international anti-bribery
instruments).
83. Good Practice Guidance, supra note 61, at § A.6.ii.
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matters pertaining to the contract.”84 Regarding breach of an anticorruption provision, the PACI Principles advise that an enterprise “should
monitor the conduct of its agents, advisers and other intermediaries and
should have a contractual right of termination in case of conduct
inconsistent with the [enterprise’s compliance program].”85
Providing companies with more concrete direction, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 2012 published a model anti-corruption
clause (ICC Clause) as guidance “designed to be applied by enterprises of
any size, whether large, medium or small.”86 The ICC Clause aims “to
provide parties with a contractual provision that will reassure them about
the integrity of their counterparts during the pre-contractual period as well
as during the term of the contract and even thereafter,” and offers two
contractual alternatives that parties can insert into a contract, with the first
constituting a more substantive anti-corruption undertaking by the parties.87
This first alternative incorporates Part I of the ICC Rules on
Combating Corruption (ICC Rules),88 where each party agrees that it, its
officers, directors, or employees “have not offered, promised, given,
authorized, solicited or accepted any undue . . . advantage . . . in any way
connected with the [c]ontract and that it has taken reasonable measures to
prevent . . . third parties, subject to its control or determining influence,
from doing so.”89
The parties also agree that, “at all times in connection with and
throughout the course of the [c]ontract and thereafter,” they will not engage
in bribery, extortion or solicitation, trading in influence or money
84. WORLD ECON. FORUM, ANTI-CORRUPTION HANDBOOK: IMPLEMENTING THE PACI
PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY 31 (2007), https://www.compliance-instituut.nl/wpcontent/uploads/PACI-Implementation-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JEE-AKHM].
85. Id. The World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines similarly recommend
the inclusion of a contractual termination right in the event of a business counterparty’s
corrupt misconduct. Integrity Compliance Guidelines, supra note 61, at § 6.2 (advising that
business partner contracts should include “express contractual obligations, remedies and/or
penalties in relation to [m]isconduct (including in the case of business partners, a plan to
exit from the arrangement, such as a contractual right of termination, in the event that the
business partner engages in [m]isconduct)).”
86. ICC, ICC Anti-Corruption Clause 1 (2012), http://icc.tobb.org.tr/docs/ICCAnti-corr
uptionClauseebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN2U-UBVJ].
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. The ICC presents two options for inclusion, either by reference or by
incorporation of the full text of Part I, as in some jurisdictions incorporation by reference
may be inadequate to create legal effects. See Lauri Railas, The Origins and Advantages of
the International Chamber of Commerce Anti-Corruption Clause, ETHIC INTELLIGENCE
(Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.ethic-intelligence.com/en/resources/experts-corner/internation
al-experts/217-the-origins-and-advantages-of-the-icc-anti-corruption-clause.html [https://per
ma.cc/PU2D-8ET2] (analyzing the ICC Clause).
89. Id. at 4.
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laundering, and that they will take “reasonable measures” to ensure that the
third parties they engage will likewise refrain from such activity.90 Finally,
the first alternative provides a right to suspend or terminate the contract if a
party provides evidence that its counterparty has materially breached the
above anti-corruption provisions, and the counterparty fails to take the
necessary remedial action.91 Upon notice of apparent breach, the notified
counterparty may invoke a defense by proving that, at the time the evidence
of breach had arisen, it had implemented “adequate anti-corruption
preventive measures . . . capable of detecting corruption and of promoting a
culture of integrity in its organization.”92
The second alternative offers a weaker undertaking for the contracting
parties. It mandates that each party simply commits to putting into place a
corporate anti-corruption compliance program at the time the parties enter
into the contract or soon thereafter, and advises that the compliance
program should be “adapted to [each party’s] particular circumstances and
capable of detecting corruption and of promoting a culture of integrity in its
organization.”93 The parties must maintain such program throughout the
contract’s lifetime,94 and if one party proffers evidence that the
counterparty’s compliance program contains material deficiencies that
undermine its efficiency, it can require the counterparty to take remedial
action upon notice. If the counterparty fails to remediate, the notifying
party has the right to suspend or terminate the contract.95
The Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre (GIACC) also
issued guidance on anti-corruption model clauses that can be included in
organizations’ contracts with business associates, and the GIACC model
terms expand the range of anti-corruption commitments beyond those
90. Id. In connection with taking “reasonable measures” with third party agents, the
ICC Clause mandates that the contracting parties “should instruct them neither to engage
nor to tolerate that they engage in any act of corruption; not use them as a conduit for any
corrupt practice; hire them only to the extent appropriate for the regular conduct of the
[p]arty’s business; and not pay them more than an appropriate remuneration for their
legitimate services.” ICC, supra note 86, at 5.
91. Id. at 5. For a discussion on how a breach of a non-corruption obligation can be
remedied, see Railas, supra note 88 (arguing that the breaches that are not attributable to the
directing mind of an organization may be remedied by a reorganization of work, increased
surveillance, or firing the individuals who committed the offense).
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 5. Lauri Railas explains that the ICC included the second alternative in the
final days of preparation to address concerns over a contracting party’s improper motives.
See Railas, supra note 88 (explaining that “[t]here was a fear that random actions of
insignificant employees would jeopardise the existence of a long-term contractual
relationship in a situation where a contracting partner wants to get rid of a binding contract
that has become disadvantageous due to commercial developments.”).
94. ICC, supra note 86, at 5.
95. Id. at 6.
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proffered by the ICC Clause.96 Like the ICC, the GIACC offers two
contractual alternatives, with the first constituting a simple commitment for
the contracting business associate “not to participate in any corrupt
conduct.”97 The second alternative offers more comprehensive anticorruption commitments for an organization’s choosing, including
provisions concerning corruption prevention, training, auditing,
investigating, and termination rights.98
The GIACC’s more comprehensive provisions mandate that, inter
alia, the business associate agree that it, its personnel, subsidiaries, and
related companies will not participate in any corrupt practices relating to
the contract and that it will take reasonable steps to ensure that its agents
and associates do not participate in any corrupt practices.99 The business
associate must also confirm that it, its owners, directors, and managers
“have not been investigated, convicted or debarred for corruption.”100
Moreover, the business associate must agree to provide anti-corruption
training to its personnel, and allow the contracting counterparty to (i) audit
the business associate in relation to the underlying transaction,101 (ii)
undertake an investigation in the event of suspected or actual corruption

96. GIACC, Contract Terms §§ 1-5 (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.giaccentre.org/contract
_terms.php [https://perma.cc/5DVF-PDM8] [hereinafter GIACC Contract Terms]. The
GIACC is an independent non-profit organization whose mission is to provide resources to
assist in understanding, identifying, and preventing corruption in the infrastructure,
construction, and engineering sectors. GIACC, About GIACC (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.
giaccentre.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/QE3N-C8UD].
97. GIACC Contract Terms, supra note 96, at § 4. The GIACC defines a “business
associate” to mean “any party with which the organisation contracts, including but not
limited to clients, customers, joint venture partners, consortium partners, contractors,
consultants, sub-contractors, suppliers, vendors, advisors, agents, distributors,
representatives and intermediaries (but excluding the organisation’s personnel).” GIACC,
Business Associate Corruption Risk Assessment (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.giaccentre.org/
RiskAssessment-BusinessAssociate.php
[https://perma.cc/5DVF-PDM8]
[hereinafter
GIACC Corruption Risk Assessment].
98. GIACC, Sample Anti-Corruption Contract Commitments §§ 1-12 (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.giaccentre.org/documents/GIACC.WEBSITE.CONTRACTTERMS.SAMPLE.d
ocx [https://perma.cc/5V3A-VB33] [hereinafter GIACC Sample Commitments].
99. GIACC Contract Terms, supra note 96, at § 5. The GIACC defines corrupt conduct
to include bribery, extortion, fraud, cartels, abuse of power, embezzlement, and money
laundering. GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at 1.
100. GIACC Contract Terms, supra note 96, at § 5(c). Under this provision, the business
associate also agrees to notify its counterparty immediately in writing if at any time it
becomes aware of any such investigation, conviction, or debarment. GIACC Sample
Commitments, supra note 98, at § 2(b).
101. The purpose of the audit is for an organization to ensure as far as practicable that
any payments it made to the business associate under the contract have not been used
corruptly. GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at § 7.
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involving the business associate,102 and (iii) terminate the contract
immediately in the event that the business associate breaches any of the
anti-corruption provisions.103 Finally, the business associate must agree to
indemnify the counterparty for any liability or loss suffered due to any
breach by the business associate of the anti-corruption provisions.104
C. Parties May Harness Broad Powers Through an Expanded Range
of Anti-Corruption Commitments
Anti-corruption contractual provisions offer basic protection that can
address compliance obligations under the FCPA, UK Bribery Act, and
other applicable laws when a company enters into an agreement with a
business associate. Contracting parties may avail themselves of a wide
range of anti-corruption undertakings and representations that can further
strengthen anti-corruption commitments and that extend beyond those
proffered by the ICC Clause and the GIACC model provisions. Such
clauses fall into nine broad categories: (i) representations and warranties
pertaining to compliance with relevant anti-corruption laws, (ii) rights to
conduct audits of the third party’s books and records, (iii) termination
rights connected to any breach of the anti-corruption provisions, (iv)
indemnification rights, (v) cooperation rights, (vi) restrictions on the use of
sub-contractors, (vii) on-going training requirements, (viii) annual
certification requirements, and (ix) re-qualification requirements.
i. Representations & Warranties Pertaining to Anti-Corruption
Compliance
To follow a minimal requirement for an anti-corruption contractual
commitment, a company can implement as an administrative procedure
including in contracts between the company and any relevant business
associate a simple provision that prohibits corruption.105 The clause could

102. The investigation provision requires the business associate to “provide all
reasonable assistance, information and documentation to [the counterparty] during the
course of the investigation.” GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at § 10.
103. GIACC Contract Terms, supra note 96, at § 5(g).
104. Id. at § 5(h).
105. Corrupt practices are typically defined to include bribery, extortion, fraud, abuse of
power, cartels, embezzlement, money laundering, and any similar activities. See GIACC
Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at 1 (defining corrupt practices); INT’L FIN. INSTS.
ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, UNIFORM FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING AND COMBATING
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION 1 (Sept. 2006), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Generic-Documents/Uniform_Framework_for_Combatting_Fraud_and_Co
rruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNE3-YAYT] (defining fraudulent and corrupt practices).
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require the parties to agree that they have not, and will not, participate in
any corrupt practices in relation to the contract.106 The ASCO Transport &
Logistics client terms & conditions contract contains a clause that
exemplifies this approach, where “[e]ach party warrants and represents that
in negotiating and concluding the contract it has complied, and in
performing its obligations under the contract it has complied and shall
comply, with all applicable anti-bribery laws.”107
A company could more rigorously expand the scope of this clause,
thereby expanding its protection, such that the business associate agrees to
ensure that its personnel, partners, sub-contractors, suppliers, consultants,
and other agents, as well as its subsidiaries and related companies, will not
participate in any corrupt practices related to the contract. It could further
supplement this protection by requiring the business associate to confirm
that it, its owners, directors, and officers have not been investigated,
convicted, or debarred for corruption.108 In connection with such
provisions, some companies make reference to their business partnerspecific ethical codes of conduct to set broader ethical expectations.109
Finally, a company could require the business associate to warrant
further that the business associate has implemented an anti-corruption
compliance program that sets out adequate procedures designed to comply
with the applicable anti-corruption laws and that the business associate will
106. Per the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) guidance, “[t]he contracts should
warrant that the associated person has not and will not breach relevant anti-corruption laws.”
Meloni & Ereira, supra note 7, at 6 (quoting the BBA guidance).
107. ASCO Transport & Logistics, AT&L Client Terms & Conditions § 28.1 (Mar. 2,
2017), http://www.ascoworld.com/atl/images/terms_and_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/38
J3-44KM] [hereinafter ASCO T&L]. Accord TUI Group, Information on the AntiCorruption Clause (2018), https://www.tuigroup.com/en-en/meta/purchase_conditions/anticorruption-clause [https://perma.cc/F6Q7-FDAP] (stating that “[t]he supplier agrees to
comply with all German legislation to combat corruption in the execution of the
contractually agreed services”). For an alternative approach that includes bribery-specific
compliance template language, see Michael Volkov, Contracts and Anti-Corruption
Compliance (July 17, 2011), https://blog.volkovlaw.com/2011/07/contracts-and-anti-corrupt
ion-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/DE7C-4PDM] (providing that the business associate in all
undertakings “will make no payments of . . . anything of value, nor will such be offered,
promised, or paid, directly or indirectly, to any foreign officials, political parties, party
officials, candidates for public or political party office, to influence the acts of such
[persons] in their official capacity, to induce them to use their influence . . . to obtain or
retain business or gain an improper advantage in connection with any business venture or
contract in which the company is a participant”).
108. See McInnes, supra note 64, at 3 (discussing anti-corruption contractual
warranties).
109. See, e.g., PHILLIPS 66, STANDARD COMPLIANCE CLAUSES 1–2 (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.phillips66.co.uk/EN/about/commercial-uk/Documents/compliance%20clauses
%20%20trading%20170124.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE7C-4PDM] (referencing standards of
business ethics and business partner principles of conduct).
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maintain and comply with its program for the duration of the contract.110
Veolia follows this approach in its agreements with its suppliers, where a
“[s]upplier undertakes to put in place and implement all necessary and
reasonable policies and measures to prevent corruption.”111 Such a
provision effectively compels the business associate to maintain an internal
anti-corruption compliance program for the duration of the contract.
ii. Rights to Conduct Audits on a Counterparty
As corruption by its nature transpires in secrecy, typically leaving no
evidence trail, a company faces practical difficulties in determining
whether its business partner has infringed upon an anti-corruption provision
in an agreement.112 The conclusions of an audit of a business partner’s
financial books and records may produce evidence of infringement,
rendering an audit one of the few means for companies to detect corruption
and resulting infringement by a business partner.113 A contractuallyprovided audit right can accordingly provide a party with a mechanism to
monitor compliance with its anti-corruption commitments. The purpose of
the audit confirms to a party that, as far as practicable, no payments made
by that party to its counterparty under the agreement have been used
corruptly.114 Parties can draft audit rights provisions to provide assurance
that a counterparty maintains accurate financial books and records and
well-functioning anti-corruption internal controls.115
Companies have also drafted audit rights provisions to include an
express right to audit the existence, content, and implementation of a

110. See ASCO T&L, supra note 107, at § 28.2 (“The contractor warrants that it has [a
compliance program] setting out adequate procedures to comply with applicable anti-bribery
laws and that it will comply with such [compliance program] in respect of the contract”).
111. Veolia, Anti Corruption Clause § 1.3 (2018), https://www.veolia.com/anz/anti-co
rruption-clause-0 [https://perma.cc/UT43-N6SQ].
112. See, e.g., JSG Trading Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 545
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that “[w]ithout a finding of secrecy and intent to induce, there
appears to be nothing to distinguish an illegal bribe from a simple promotional gift”); United
States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that “no public official . . .
takes bribes openly”); Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 A.D. 384, 391 (N.Y. App. Div.
1908) (remarking that “[t]he vice [of bribery] lies in making the agreement without the
knowledge of the master”).
113. Witness statements, particularly as a result of a whistleblowing mechanism, are
another avenue to produce such evidence. See ICC, supra note 86, at 10 (discussing
evidence of non-compliance with anti-corruption commitments).
114. See GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at §§ 4–8 (detailing the purpose
of audit rights provisions).
115. See Grimm, supra note 64, at 147 (explaining that audit rights provide insurance
that books and records are accurate, and the counterparty has strong internal controls).
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counterparty’s compliance program.116 From the range of anti-corruption
provisions available, audit rights provisions are possibly the most
contentious, due to the intrusive nature of the audit process. In the event of
objections, a party can narrow the scope of audit rights to apply only to
those financial records that pertain to the performance of the relevant
contract, or structure the audit provisions such that a third party would
conduct any audit, to overcome the possibility of such objections.117
The DOJ has signaled the importance of audit rights in its issued
FCPA guidance to individuals and companies118 and through its Opinion
Procedure Releases,119 where the inclusion of audit rights in contracts with
business partners comprised a feature of the opinion requestors’
compliance programs.120
The Ministry of Justice likewise has
acknowledged the significance of including such provisions in contracts
with business partners to prevent bribery.121

116. See ASCO T&L, supra note 107, at § 28.3 (saying “on provision of no less than
thirty (30) days’ formal notice, the Company . . . shall have the right to audit, at its own
cost, the existence, content and implementation of the Contractor’s [compliance program],
but such right shall not include access to documents that are legally privileged or were
created for the purpose of an on-going internal investigation”); PAUL MARSHALL & EVE
BRAZIER, THE OIL & GAS “CONTRACTING COMPASS”: POINTING THE COMPASS TOWARD ANTIBRIBERY & CORRUPTION 12 (Dec. 8, 2017), https://brodies.com/sites/default/files/brodies_ll
p_-_anti-bribery_corruption_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N8Q-HDLW] (analyzing
audit rights provisions).
117. Angela M. Xenakis, Contracting with Third-Party Reps: FCPA Risks, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2012, 1:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/361944/contracting-with-third-p
arty-reps-fcpa-risks [https://perma.cc/XJ6D-RGCL].
118. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 25, at 60 (saying that “companies should
undertake some form of ongoing monitoring of third-party relationships . . . this may
include . . . exercising audit rights”).
119. The FCPA Opinion Procedure process allows private parties to obtain the DOJ’s
opinion as to whether certain specified, prospective—not hypothetical—conduct conforms
with the DOJ’s present enforcement policy regarding the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014).
120. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 2004–02 (July 12,
2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/0402.pd
f [https://perma.cc/CZ2H-M4P9] (acknowledging the “inclusion in all agreements . . . with
all . . . Business Partners of provisions . . . allowing for internal and independent audits of
the books and records of the . . . Business Partner to ensure compliance with the [anticorruption contractual provisions]”). See also DOJ Release 2008–02, supra note 68
(making a similar acknowledgement).
121. BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 39 (acknowledging the inclusion of
“suitable contractual terms on bribery prevention measures in [an] agreement between
[parties], for example: . . . giving [one party] the ability to audit [the counterparty’s]
activities and expenditure”).
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iii. Addressing Infringement Through Termination, Suspension,
Cooperation and Indemnification Rights
If a party breaches its obligations under an anti-corruption clause, the
breach may trigger termination of the contract. Options abound, as parties
may include rights to suspend and terminate a contract unilaterally in the
event of a material breach of an anti-corruption commitment within,122 such
as a party violating an applicable anti-corruption law.123 A party can
further include in the provision an agreement that in the event corrupt
payments are made in connection with the contract, the contract is void,
and deem any violation of an applicable anti-corruption law to constitute
grounds for withholding any outstanding payments related to the illicit
conduct.124
Parties can structure a termination right to provide the alleged
breaching party an opportunity to remedy a suspected breach125 if such
remedy is possible under the circumstances.126 In some instances,
companies include an obligation to notify in connection with any instance
of corruption, essentially requiring their suppliers as part of their
engagement terms and conditions to notify within a reasonable time any
breach of any anti-corruption clause.127 When a party exercises its right of
termination, it typically bears the burden of proof that its counterparty has
122. See, e.g., PHILLIPS 66, supra note 109, at 2 (stating that “[e]ither party may
terminate the [a]greement forthwith upon written notice to the other at any time, if in its
reasonable judgement, the other is in breach of any of the representations, warranties or
undertakings in this anti-corruption section”); Veolia, supra note 111, at § 7 (saying that
“[i]f Supplier breaches any term of this [anti-corruption] clause: . . . Veolia may
immediately terminate this [a]greement without notice and without incurring any liability”).
123. See Xenakis, supra note 117 (advising to “[i]nclude a provision stating that a
violation of anti-corruption laws constitutes a material breach of contract”).
124. Xenakis, supra note 117. But see MARSHALL & BRAZIER, supra note 116, at 13
(explaining that “[t]he right to suspend payment is not an absolute right but is qualified by
reasonableness”).
125. See ASCO T&L, supra note 107, at § 28.5(a) (stating that “if the C[ompany] has a
reasonable belief that the C[ontractor] has breached [the anti-corruption commitments], the
C[ompany] may give formal notice of its intention to suspend payments under the
C[ontract] to the C[ontractor] . . . [and] [i]f within seven (7) days of receipt . . . the
C[ontractor] neither responds with information reasonably satisfactory to the C[ompany] to
refute such belief nor commences and continues with action reasonably satisfactory to the
C[ompany] to remedy such suspected breach . . . the C[ompany] may . . . suspend with
immediate effect any payments due . . . without liability”).
126. While certain infringements may be impossible to remedy (e.g., a party engaging in
criminal activity), the ICC provides examples of possible remedial actions where the gravity
of infringement is relatively minor: issuing warnings, reorganizing work, terminating
employment for any personnel involved in misconduct, terminating contracts with any subcontractors involved in misconduct. ICC, supra note 86, at 9.
127. Veolia, supra note 111, at § 5.
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infringed the relevant anti-corruption provision(s).128
Suspension rights allow a company to suspend performance of the
relevant contract and any associated payments thereof, with or without
notice, often for either a defined period, or for as long as the company
considers necessary to investigate any alleged infringement by its business
partner of any material anti-corruption provision. The company in drafting
a suspension rights clause can include language noting that it will not incur
liability or obligation to its counterparty for exercising a suspension
right.129 Moreover, a company can obligate its business partner by contract
to initiate a document hold exercise where the business partner agrees to
take all reasonable steps to prevent the loss or destruction of any
documentary evidence related to the relevant alleged infringing conduct.130
In connection with suspension rights, the company can also require its
business partner to provide all reasonable information, documentation, and
assistance to the company during the course of the investigation.131 Such a
cooperation right can require a business provider to cooperate fully with
any corruption-related investigation, including the review of any emails
and bank account information pertinent to the underlying transaction.132
In the event a party breaches an anti-corruption clause, an
indemnification provision requires the breaching party to agree to
indemnify its counterparty for damages, losses, or expenses incurred by
that counterparty arising out of the breach.133 The provision can cover the
indemnified party’s expenses from any corruption investigation or
prosecution brought about by the breaching party’s activities.134 Certain
128. See ICC, supra note 86, at 10 (analyzing the effects of termination and specifying
that amounts contractually due at the time of termination typically remain payable, if
permitted by applicable law).
129. See Veolia, supra note 111, at § 6.1 (asserting a suspension right without notice).
130. Id. at § 6.2.
131. GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at § 10.
132. See Volkov, supra note 107 (describing the compliance provisions that should be
included in business partner contracts).
133. See Veolia, supra note 111, at § 7.2 (asserting an indemnification right to the
maximum extent allowed by law); Joanna Kay, Anti-Corruption Provisions and Upstream
Joint Ventures—Boilerplate or Bespoke?, MONDAQ (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.mondaq.co
m/unitedstates/x/390538/Oil+Gas+Electricity/AntiCorruption+Provisions+and+Upstream+J
oint+Ventures+Boilerplate+or+Bespoke [https://perma.cc/VL2Q-VYXD] (explaining that
each party may undertake to indemnify the other for any losses suffered as a result of the
admission of allegations of an anti-corruption violation, or the final adjudication that there
has been a corruption violation applicable to that party).
134. See Xenakis, supra note 117 (describing termination provision structuring). For a
sample anti-corruption indemnity clause. See also SHEVAN ALGAMA, BIMCO ANTICORRUPTION CLAUSE 2 (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.shipownersclub.com/media/2016/04/B
IMCO-Anti-Corruption-Clause.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBD4-D2TV] (remarking that “[i]f
either party fails to comply with any applicable anti-corruption legislation it shall defend
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indemnities however may be contrary to public policy and unenforceable,
such as an indemnity to cover criminal fines and penalties.135
iv. Additional Rights, Restrictions, and Requirements Available by
Contract
The remaining set of rights and restrictions available to contracting
parties largely center upon ongoing compliance monitoring and review. In
connection with a party’s engagement of subcontractors, a company can
require its business partner to agree that it will not engage any
subcontractor, consultant, or other agent without the company’s prior
written consent.136 Such a restriction may allow either contracting party to
conduct appropriate anti-corruption due diligence on any proposed
intermediary.137 The company can ensure that any intermediaries are
instructed not to engage in any corrupt practice, hired only to the extent
appropriate in connection with the underlying transaction, and paid only an
appropriate remuneration for legitimate services provided.138
On-going training requirements require that a party undertake any
pertinent anti-corruption training that its counterparty reasonably requires.
The counterparty requiring such training is often responsible under the
terms of the agreement for the costs of any such training.139 The purpose of
this provision aims to ensure that a business partner’s relevant personnel
receives anti-corruption training.140
The business partner’s top
management and all persons performing services in connection with the
underlying transaction would presumably receive such training too.141
Annual certification clauses typically require a counterparty to certify
that it remains aware of its anti-corruption obligations, it has not engaged in

and indemnify the other party against any fine, penalty, liability, loss or damage and for any
related costs (including, without limitation, court costs and legal fees) arising from such
breach”).
135. Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999)
(“An agreement to indemnify against intentional misconduct would, as a general rule, be
contrary to public policy and unenforceable. . . . [C]riminals should not be permitted to
profit from their own intentional misconduct.”) (internal citations omitted). See also
MARSHALL & BRAZIER, supra note 116, at 6 (discussing how criminal fines are not insurable
in England and Wales).
136. See Volkov, supra note 107 (discussing subcontractor compliance efforts).
137. See McInnes, supra note 64 (examining intermediary due diligence initiatives); see
also Xenakis, supra note 117 (discussing intermediary due diligence initiatives as well).
138. ICC, supra note 86, at 8 (providing a sample provision addressing intermediaries).
139. GIACC Sample Commitments, supra note 98, at § 3 (evaluating training
obligations).
140. GIACC Contract Terms, supra note 96, at § 5(d).
141. See Volkov, supra note 107 (analyzing training best practices).
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conduct that violates any applicable anti-corruption laws, and it is not
aware of any such conduct by its employees and agents.142 Finally, requalification clauses require a counterparty to re-qualify as a legitimate
business partner at regular intervals.143 The re-qualification process allows
a party to conduct updated due diligence on its business partner and review
the relevant contract during its lifespan to assess any corruption concerns
that may have arisen.144
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HARNESSING CONTRACTUAL LAW TO
FIGHT CORRUPTION IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR
Anti-corruption provisions in contracts with third parties constitute a
critical soft-law initiative that can facilitate constraining corruption in
international business transactions.145 From a corporate perspective, they
provide a means for private sector entities to signal their commitment to
abiding by pertinent anti-corruption law(s), to integrate anti-corruption
commitments into their commercial dialogue with agents, to strengthen the
monitoring and supervision of projects with such agents, and to address
corruption risks at all stages of the pertinent contract’s lifespan with
predictability.146 From the perspective of corporate directors and officers,
who potentially face personal liability for attributable breaches of their
company’s business partners, the provisions reduce the risk of liability for
these individuals. More broadly, the provisions promote greater corporate
transparency and disclosure, “help preserve trust between [contracting]
parties and prevent corruption in both the negotiation and performance of
contracts.”147

142. See Xenakis, supra note 117 (providing an overview of annual certification
requirements in contract).
143. See Volkov, supra note 107 (discussing re-qualification obligations for contracting
parties).
144. See McInnes, supra note 64 (noting the use of anti-corruption clauses in supply
chain and subcontractor contracts).
145. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Sinéad Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage:
The Impact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest,
67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 433 (2012) (discussing benefits and costs to the U.S.
from anti-corruption soft-law initiatives).
146. See MARIE CHÊNE, EXAMPLES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION CLAUSES IN COOPERATION
AGREEMENTS 1 (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.u4.no/publications/examples-of-anti-corruptio
n-clauses-in-cooperation-agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR8G-87R8] (demonstrating the
role of anti-corruption clauses in cooperation agreements).
147. Allen, supra note 1.
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A. Harmonizing Anti-Corruption Compliance Program Operations
with Contractual Provisions Through Structured Risk Management
Any company seeking to avoid corrupt practices abroad should
construct an effective anti-corruption compliance program through a
structured risk management approach, whether that company is a
multinational corporation or simply conducts business overseas.148 An
increasingly critical feature of the compliance program involves conducting
due diligence on the selection and retention of any third party that aims to
serve as agent. Programs should facilitate as part of their mission the use
of anti-corruption provisions in contracts with third party agents, given
companies can be held liable for the acts of its agents under the FCPA and
UK Bribery Act.149 Companies should design such programs with adequate
resources and with the objective to assess and address firmly the nature and
scope of corruption risks at all stages of engagement with any third-party
agents subject to company control or determining influence. The programs
should be capable of detecting corruption and should accordingly allow for
training of company directors, officers and employees. Inclusion of anticorruption contractual provisions serves as an effective corporate tool
functioning as a component of a company’s larger compliance program.
Companies face three disparate options in including anti-corruption
provisions within contracts with third-party agents: whether to include the
provisions in all of their contracts, in contracts over a certain amount, or to
include depending upon the results of a risk assessment exercise, where
companies assess, inter alia, the underlying risk, the business relationship
and commercial needs, and the nature of the negotiations. Very few
companies follow the latter approach,150 which allows companies to
construct a specific model of risk assessment that best suits their purposes.
The risk assessment model categorizes agents into risk bands by reference
to specific objective criteria and applies different levels of due diligence
and internal controls to such agents according to the criteria.151
A risk-based approach presents an optimal method, as it can offer
148. For an overview of corporate compliance programs tailored to address international
white-collar crime, see Colin R. Jennings, Avoiding Criminal Liability for Corrupt Practices
Abroad Through Effective Corporate Compliance, 2011 WL 6740787, at *1 (2011).
149. See supra Part I.B (detailing the FCPA and UK Bribery Act liability provisions);
Jennings, supra note 148, at *6 (analyzing due diligence inquiries pertinent to third party
agents).
150. Eduard Ivanov et al., Legal Regulation of Combating Corruption: Report of the
LSGL’s Research Group 14 (Law Schs. Glob. League, Research Paper No. 2, 2014), https:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=2461487 [https://perma.cc/C76B-G8CN].
151. See GIACC Corruption Risk Assessment, supra note 97, at 1 (providing detailed
guidance on business associate corruption risk assessment).
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simplicity and proportionality to companies by providing the ability to
group anti-corruption clauses into risk bands to be deployed based upon
appropriate risk categories as a result of the risk assessment conducted. A
simple example of a tiered approach involves standard anti-corruption
provisions for lower risk relationships (such as for supply chain partners
who have existing, robust compliance programs in operation) and enhanced
provisions for higher risk relationships (such as for joint ventures,
consultants, and counterparties operating in countries classified with high
corruption risk).152 Such an approach may avoid unnecessarily burdensome
obligations in connection with lower risk relationships.153
Some advocate for the blanket inclusion of anti-corruption provisions
in all third-party contracts,154 but the use of robust provisions may add
unnecessary cost and inconvenience to the business relationship. While no
contract modality is free from corruption risks,155 longer term contracts,
contracts with large magnitude or complexity, and acquisition contracts
present higher risk, along with contracts with higher risk business
associates.156 Companies entering into such high-risk contracts could
benefit from including an expansive set of anti-corruption protections as
discussed in Part II. For instance, inserting a warranty for an agent’s
compliance with anti-corruption law may entitle an innocent party in the
event of corruption to a civil claim for breach of contract and to recover
damages that would not otherwise arise under the relevant statutory
provisions.157
Termination is notably the most effective mechanism for a company
to disavow itself of its counterparty’s corrupt activities.158 While
companies generally allow for the immediate termination of the relevant
contract if a counterparty violates any pertinent anti-corruption law or any
substantive anti-corruption contractual provision, companies seldom
include penalty clauses within their anti-corruption provisions.159 Penalties
obligating a non-compliant party to reimburse its innocent counterparty for
any fines and losses incurred as a result of the non-compliance, in addition
to the innocent party’s unilateral right to terminate the agreement, may be
an efficient starting approach for negotiations in order to address a party’s
152. See McInnes, supra note 64 (outlining steps for risk assessment).
153. Id.
154. Jennings, supra note 148, at *14 (advising companies to “include anticorruption
elements in contracts wherever possible”).
155. CHÊNE, supra note 146, at 1 (providing overview of corruption risk).
156. See Railas, supra note 88 (detailing business arrangements carrying high corruption
risk).
157. MARSHALL & BRAZIER, supra note 116, at 10–11.
158. See Xenakis, supra note 117 (noting the benefits of anti-corruption provisions).
159. Ivanov et al., supra note 150, at 14.
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potential failure to comply. The provisions in sum should “shield[] each
party from the corrupt practices of the other, while preserving the
continuity of their contractual relationship.”160
Any set of anti-corruption provisions should at minimum include an
agreement that the parties have and will comply with the applicable anticorruption laws, with clear definitions and descriptions of prohibited
conduct, and an agreement that the parties will implement reasonable and
necessary policies and practices to prevent corruption while the contract
remains in force. The provisions should also allow for a party to conduct
legitimate inquiries should red flags arise during the contract’s duration.161
More expansive provisions providing for training, audit, investigation,
termination and indemnification rights can solidify further the parties’ anticorruption commitments and protections if necessary given the risk levels
present.162
B. Enhancing Anti-Corruption Initiatives Globally Through
Expansive Use of Anti-Corruption Provisions
The use of anti-corruption provisions in contracts with foreign parties
who would otherwise not be obligated to respect anti-corruption legislation
The
serves to advance international anti-corruption objectives.163
provisions can compel foreign parties to respect anti-corruption legislation
of other jurisdictions, to implement internal anti-corruption compliance
policies and programs, and to subject their facilities and financial
statements to audit.164 Potential substantive sanctions for noncompliance
would increase the likelihood that such parties carry out their obligations
under these provisions. For these reasons, the provisions may assist in
shifting norms toward corporate anti-corruption commitments on a global
level and raising awareness of the need to avoid corruption. They signal to
all involved that corrupt actions will not be tolerated.165
Regardless of its location, a company could take the position that anticorruption contractual provisions are extraneous contract mechanisms that

160. Allen, supra note 1.
161. See Xenakis, supra note 117 (noting the benefits granted by an anti-corruption
provision).
162. See supra Part II.C (discussing the comprehensive set of anti-corruption provisions
available to parties).
163. See supra Part I (discussing international anti-corruption initiatives).
164. See Guarderas, supra note 8 (bringing attention to the powers of anti-corruption
clauses).
165. See Allen, supra note 1 (recommending the incorporation of anti-corruption clauses
into contracts).
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may cause the company to lose business to (corrupt) competitors.166 Such a
position ignores the significant liability risks under the FCPA, Bribery Act
and other laws companies may face in connection with the corrupt
activities of their third-party agents, as well as the economic harm
corruption brings to the private sector.167 Moreover, companies using the
provisions have a mechanism to oppose corrupt payments and to monitor
their agents’ behavior without any external pressure from law enforcement.
Individual profit-maximization and the avoidance of corruption can
harmonize together through effective provision usage.168
From a public policy perspective, anti-corruption contractual
provisions can reinforce a strong corporate stance against foreign bribery
and other forms of corruption and signal the value of an honest business
environment. The provisions allow corporations to participate in global
anti-corruption efforts, help level the corporate playing field, and
harmonize with international public order.169 The 10th Principle of the UN
Global Compact implores companies to “work against corruption in all its
forms, including extortion and bribery,” calling on companies to develop
policies and practices to address corruption: “We challenge companies to
join peers, governments, UN agencies and civil society to realize a more
transparent global economy.”170 Anti-corruption provisions harmonize
with this movement.
C. Recognizing the Limitations of Anti-Corruption Contractual
Provisions for Corporate Actors
While anti-corruption provisions offer benefits directly to companies
and more broadly to the larger society in connection with combatting
corruption, the provisions are not a compliance panacea for the company
that engages third-party agents.
The provisions alone constitute
insufficient protection for companies in connection with their liability
under anti-bribery laws, as companies should integrate these provisions

166. Cf. Richard Levick, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at 40: No Shortage of
Challenges, FORBES (May 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2017/05/1
6/the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-at-40-no-shortage-of-challenges/#25f81c3a5f90 [https://
perma.cc/JS8N-9Y95] (“Detractors [of the FCPA] say its benefits are exaggerated, that it
puts American companies at a competitive disadvantage, and that its compliance costs are
prohibitive for many companies.”).
167. See supra Part I.A (analyzing the effects of corruption upon economic growth).
168. See Rose-Ackerman & Hunt, supra note 145, at 461–62 (examining how corruption
can introduce inefficiencies that decrease competitiveness).
169. ICC, supra note 86, at 1.
170. Das, supra note 48.
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into a larger anti-corruption compliance program.171 Government agencies
in assessing a company’s compliance with and liability under anticorruption law may look to whether the company not only adopts but also
enforces anti-corruption provisions where reasonable in its contracts with
counterparties and links such enforcement to a larger compliance
program.172 Companies arguably court liability if they use anti-corruption
provisions in their contracts as mere boilerplate without giving the
attendant obligations under the provisions due attention.
Companies should not over-engineer anti-corruption provisions when
drafting, such that the provisions are imbalanced, one-sided and onerous,
potentially reaching beyond the law and potentially too broad to be
practicable and enforceable.173 Given the various rules of contract
interpretation, companies should ensure that the provisions receive respect
and enforcement via the ordinary course of the parties’ performance of
their contractual obligations.174 The validity of these provisions have
largely been untested in courts, and whether a court will enforce such
provisions, interpret strictly or allow as a defense against a corruption
provision based upon a default of a noncompliant counterparty remains to
be seen.175 Whether such provisions will be deemed valid judicially should
not weaken their intent when coupled with a company’s robust anticorruption compliance program.176
Regardless of the anti-corruption provisions’ specific breadth, they
should present a balanced approach that effectively regulates and manages
corruption risk. The provisions should neither be particularly onerous to
the parties, nor disproportionate to the level of risk present, nor “create
unexpected consequences by way of its exploitation for commercial
171. See supra Part II (discussing integration of anti-corruption provisions within
corporate compliance program operations).
172. See Gordon Kaiser, Corruption in the Energy Sector: Criminal Fines, Civil
Judgments, and Lost Arbitrations, 34 ENERGY L.J. 193, 210 (2013) (describing the U.S.
Department of Justice’s enforcement opinion procedure); Volkov, supra note 107 (“A
company’s commitment to anti-corruption compliance can be quickly tested by examining
its contracting practices and its use of anti-corruption provisions.”); Xenakis, supra note 117
(“The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Justice will
expect companies to exercise such rights and will look unfavorably on companies that have
included audit rights but not exercised them when there are red flags.”).
173. See MARSHALL & BRAZIER, supra note 116, at 9 (analyzing contract drafting
principles).
174. Daniel Schimmel et al., Bridging the Cultural Gap in International Arbitrations
Arising from FCPA Investigations, 39 FORDHAM INT’l L.J. 829, 838 (2016).
175. Allen, supra note 1.
176. Id. See also ICC, supra note 86, at 2 (“An entity, whether an arbitral tribunal or
other dispute resolution body, rendering a decision in accordance with the dispute resolution
provisions of the contract, shall have the authority to determine the contractual
consequences of any alleged non-compliance with the [anti-corruption] [c]lause[s].”).
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purposes.”177 The provisions should reflect the parties’ genuine intent to
combat corruption and not function to exploit corruption as an unfair or
sham mechanism for terminating contractual arrangements.178 For instance,
the provisions should enable the parties to work together when confronting
and resisting demands for illicit payments.179
D. Encouraging the Usage of Anti-Corruption Provisions Through
Expanded Domestic Legislation & Regulation
Over the last two decades, government enforcement agencies have
been enforcing anti-corruption legislation with increased rigor,180 creating
what has been deemed a “highly adversarial relationship between
enforcement agencies and firms.”181 Companies may implement numerous
strategies to reduce their exposure to corrupt practices, including robust due
diligence, rigorous compliance systems and expansive contractual
remedies, but these efforts may not ultimately protect when operating in an
uncertain enforcement landscape.182
Given the degree of uncertainty surrounding the FCPA in particular,
recent calls to amend this law abound.183 In connection with the corporate
compliance function, Professor Steve Salbu argues for the establishment of
“standards for rigorous compliance programs that would provide qualifying
companies with a defense against entity liability for the corrupt behavior of
individuals.”184 Under Salbu’s proposal, business entities could enjoy
robust, clearly defined defenses upon implementing qualifying good-faith
compliance programs through well-articulated and formulated standards.185
His qualified good-faith compliance program defense can be further
enhanced by explicitly incorporating the use of anti-corruption provisions
with third-party agents as a required practice where appropriate.
177. Railas, supra note 88.
178. See Kay, supra note 133 (examining termination rights).
179. See ALGAMA, supra note 134, at 1 (discussing contractual provisions that facilitate
cooperation in connection with illegal payment requests in the shipping industry).
180. Michael S. Diamant et al., Sanctionable Practices at the World Bank: Interpretation
and Enforcement, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 985, 992 (2016).
181. Steven R. Salbu, Mitigating the Harshness of FCPA Enforcement Through a
Qualifying Good-Faith Compliance Defense, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 475 (2018).
182. Daniel J. Grimm, Traversing the Minefield: Joint Ventures & the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 91, 93 (2014).
183. See, e.g., Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and
Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
247, 299–300, 331 (2010) (stating specific ways in which the uncertainty surrounding the
FCPA could be resolved).
184. Salbu, supra note 181, at 475.
185. Id. at 479.
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Such a good-faith defense can offer a safe harbor in connection with
third-party agent liability for companies that (i) insert substantive anticorruption provisions within their contracts with such agents and (ii)
incorporate enforcement of such provisions as appropriate within a larger
internal compliance program designed to comply with relevant anticorruption laws. Companies meeting the above conditions should enjoy a
full defense from liability arising from corrupt acts of third-party agents.
The “policies and procedures” defense to “failure to prevent” offenses
under Section 7 of the Bribery Act could also benefit from legislative
reform such that it explicitly endorses anti-corruption contractual provision
usage as a compliance program component that shields entities from thirdparty liability concerns.186
Revising anti-corruption legislation such as the FCPA and Bribery Act
in this manner could benefit both private and public sectors. The revisions
could provide businesses with direct incentives to develop strong anticorruption compliance programs that use and enforce anti-corruption
contractual provisions appropriately. The revisions could also decrease
transaction costs related to uncertainty in the domestic and international
marketplace,187 help prevent future corruption violations, facilitate
companies’ self-policing in the fight against corruption, and boost ethicscentered corporate cultures along with the credibility of government
enforcement agencies.188
CONCLUSION
Contract law offers a unique platform to assist a company in avoiding
corruption actions.
Properly structured anti-corruption contractual
provisions with third parties can significantly reduce legal and performance
risks and reputational concerns associated with third-party corrupt action,
provided the provisions receive due enforcement in conjunction with the
operations of an internal compliance program. Companies can draft these
provisions most effectively in a risk-sensitive manner, recognizing that
using these provisions contributes toward an ultimate purpose of removing
186. See supra Part I.B (detailing the Bribery Act “policies and procedures” defense).
187. See Adam Prestidge, Avoiding FCPA Surprises: Safe Harbor from Successor
Liability in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305, 333
(2013) (“A safe harbor rule . . . removes the need to compensate for uncertainty with
expensive due diligence, decreasing the costs of these types of transactions because
companies are able to pursue transactions with greater assurance that even if violations
exist, they will not be penalized for those violations if otherwise compliant.”).
188. See Salbu, supra note 181, at 535 (noting the benefits of a compliance program
defense to the credibility of the FCPA and the DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA enforcement system
and practices).
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